By Chris Langdon- - Preface-

       North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper perpetrated fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court in order to prevent me from obtaining compensation for: the taking [destruction] of my property in Polk County, N.C; and other claims [Fraud by the NCDOT (N.C. Dept. of Transp.) and T.L Mallonee, serving under Governor Michael Easley at the time, and the destruction of my property, is described on the "Fraud NC Courts," page, top left].  Roy Cooper's fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court was assisted by his associates Robert Crawford III (now in private practice) and Lisa Glover.  Roy Cooper, Robert Crawford III, and Lisa Glover perpetrated their fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court in their Brief in Opposition,case no. 02-12, hereafter Brief.  Unfortunately. the U.S. Supreme Court only hears a small percentage of cases submitted to it, and my cases were not among those, therefore Cooper's fraud went unreviewed. Cooper and his cronies have been aware of this site since its inception, more than nine months ago, and no one has asked for a retraction.

      I. One of the fraudulent statements by Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover, regarding my lawsuits, Langdon v. Tippett and Langdon v. Swain, is as follows.

         "Plaintiff's Complaints were properly dismissed as frivolous on the grounds of res judicata and/or failure to state a claim and qualified immunity."  Brief in Opposition (02-12), pp, iv, 14 (Statement #1)

        That one sentence contains  numerous lies.  The truth is:  (1)  Langdon v. Swain was not dismissed by the district court because of "qualified immunity" ;  (2) Langdon v. Tippett was not dismissed by the district court because of "qualified immunity" ;  (3)  the U.S. Court of Appeals did not rule that Langdon v. Swain was, or should have been, dismissed because of "qualified immunity" ;  (4)  the U.S. Court of Appeals did not rule that Langdon v. Tippett was, or should have been, dismissed because of "qualified immunity"; (5)  the district court did not dismiss Langdon v. Swain for a "failure to state a claim";  (6)  the district court did not dismiss Langdon v. Tippett for a "failure to state a claim" ;  (7)  the U.S. Court of Appeals did not dismiss Langdon v. Tippett for a failure to state a claim;  (8) the U.S. Court of Appeals did erroneously hold that Langdon v. Swain failed to state a claim, purportedly because a claim for just compensation may not be filed in federal court against state officials sued in their individual capacities.  However, Cooper later admitted that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling on the issue was in error.

         "The Fourth Circuit.. noted that Langdon v. Swain ..was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 'because takings actions sound against governmental entities rather than individual state employees sued in their individual capacities' .. However, it appears that the court may have overlooked Plaintiff's assertions that his claim was based on 42 U.S.C. 1983, under which it is possible to sue a state official in his individual capacity." Brief, p. 8(Statement #2) 

       By Cooper's own admisison, Statement #1 is false because it contradicts Statement #2 as to the purported issue of a supposed failure to state a claim. Statement #1 is also false because it alleges that my Complaints were properly dismissed because of res judicata (lies #9 & #10).  Cooper contradicted that assertion as well:

          "Thus, it may have not been appropriate for the lower courts to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in Langdon v. Swain on the grounds of res judicata."  Brief, p.20 (Statement #3)

    Cooper mentioned res judicata 23 times in his Brief, fraudulently stating and /or implying that dismissal of Langdon v. Swain because of res judicata was proper, as in the following:

        " However, Plaintiff's Complaint and attachments filed in Langdon v. Swain showed on their face that res judicata was applicable."  Brief in Opposition (02-12), p. 17 (Statement #4)

    However, only once in those 23 mentionings of res judicata did Roy Cooper admit that res judicata did not apply to Langdon v. Swain.  Cooper, Crawford and Glover also fraudulently concealed from the U.S. Supreme Court the fact that they had fraudulently stated before the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, that res judicata did apply to Langdon v. Swain, contrary to Statement #3, supra.  All told, I have exposed 39 instances of fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court by Cooper, Crawford and Glover, including numerous outright lies.  In addition to the fraud regarding qualified immunity in Statement #1, supra, Cooper deceived the U.S. Supreme Court by mentioning qualified immunity an additional four times (pp.8, 20-21), raising Cooper's fraud total to 43.  

       II.  The district court erroneously held that it had the

power to dismiss my Complaints, without notice and an

opportunity to be heard, under 28 U.S.C. 1915, the

In-Forma Pauperis Statute, and under Arizona v. Cali-

fornia, 120 S.Ct. 2304 (2000).  I was not given any oppor-

tunity to challenge the dismissals in the district court.

      Before the Fourth Circuit, Cooper, Crawford and Glover

fraudulently alleged that the district court had the authority to

dismiss my Complaints via the In Forma Pauperis Statute

(28 U.S.C. 1915) although my Complaints were not filed

In Forma Pauperis, and I have never been a prisoner.  No

other court has ever dismissed a non-prisoner, non-informa

 pauperis, complaint via 28 U.S.C. 1915.  Cooper failed to cite

any case law that supported his postion.  He also failed

to cite the contrary, controlling case law that holds that the

legislative intent of 28 U.S.C. 1915, the In-Forma Pauperis

Statute, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

is to reduce the number of frivolous, in forma pauperis

lawsuits by prisoners.  See: Roller v. Gunn, 107 F. 3d 227,

 228, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1997);  Crawford-El v. Britton,  

525 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. at 1596 (1998).  His failure to cite

the contrary, controlling case law is a violation of the Model

Rules of Professional Conduct and is fraud the Court.

          In the U.S.Supreme Court, Cooper, Crawford and

Glover reversed themselves and admitted that the

dismissals were:

       "..with a (perhaps erroneous) citation to 28 U.S.C. 1915.  However, Plaintiff fails to show any abuse of discretion in the courts' exercise of their inherent powers to dismiss his Complaints.."   Brief in Opposition (02-12), p. 7 (Statement # 5)

       That statement fraudulently concealed from the U.S.

Supreme Court the fact that they had argued the opposite

before the Fourth Circuit Fraud #44), where they falsely

argued that the district court did have the authority to

dismiss my Complaints via 28 U.S.C. 1915.

      In Statement #5, supra, Roy Cooper, Crawford and

Glover fraudulently stated that the courts had exercised

their "inherent powers" to dismiss my Complaints. That is

false.  Neither the district court, nor the Fourth Circuit,

exercised their inherent powers in dismissing my

Complaints (Fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court #45).    

        Also, Cooper, Crawford and Glover failed to cite the

controlling case law which states that if the lower courts

did not exercise their inherent power, the issue is not

properly before the U.S. Supreme Court (Fraud #46).

       "Respondents' contention that the federal courts posses inherent authority..will not be considered by this Court, since the lower courts did not invoke such authority in reaching their decisions."  Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 297[3] (1989)

       Roy Cooper, Crawford & Glover, are aware of

Mallard, they cited it on page 7 of their Brief. 

         They also fraudulently argued before the 4th Circuit

that the district court had the authority to dismiss my

Complaints under the authority of Arizona v. California, a

fact that they concealed from the Supreme Court (Fraud

#47).  Arizona holds that a federal court may dismiss a 

Complaint on its own motion, because of res judicata, if

it has previoulsy decided the same claim between the same

parties, and it has the record of the case.  However, Arizona

did not apply to me because I had never filed any previous

claims against the defendants in Langdon v. Swain, or,

Langdon v. Tippett, in any federal court.  The district court

dismissed my Complaints, purportedly, because of a prior

state court decision.  The district court (Judge Thornburgh)

did not have a copy of the record of the prior state case,

nor any documents at all from the case. 

       Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Cooper

abandoned any argument that the courts had authority to

dismiss my Complaints via  Arizona and admitted that the

courts lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. 1915.  When a

court acts, it must act under a valid authority, or, its 

judgments are void.  The district court purported to act

under 28 U.S.C. 1915 and Arizona, when it dismissed my

Complaints, without notice and an opportunity to be heard,

the essence of due process of law.  The 4th Circuit upheld,

citing only 28 U.S.C. 1915. 

      Therefore, Cooper and his associates admitted that the

lower courts lacked authority to dismiss my Complaints

under the only authorities they cited.  To make the void

 judgments appear valid, Cooper, and the other miscreants,

concocted the lie that the lower courts acted under their

inherent authority (Statement #5)

       III.  Although the allged judgemnts in Langdon v.

Tippett and Langdon v. Swain are void, the W.D.N.C. has

illegally blocked me from seeking relief from the alleged

judgments, procured through fraud.  The W.D.N.C. has

also barred me from appealing any of its decisions that bar

me from seeking relief from the fraudulently judgments. 

      IV.  The miscreants attached a purported release

agreement to their Brief in Opposition.  However, they did

not argue in said brief that my claims were barred by the

alleged release.  I demonstrated in my pleadings in the

lower courts that the alleged release was procured through

fraud. It was not pled as a defense by the defendants in

the lower courts, and if they had, the defense would have

been waived when they admitted that res judicata did not

apply to Langdon v. Swain.  Even if the purported release

had been valid, properly pled, and not waived, it still

wouldn't have barred my claims.  The alleged release

refers to the damage from a landslide (singular) occurring

in June, 1995.  Langdon v. Swain contains claims for

damages from a series of landslides that began on, or

about, July 1st, 1995, rendering my property useless by

September, 1997.  I  believe that the N.C. attorneys

mis-represented the number of slides, when they occurred,

and the amount of damage they caused, in order to make

it apear that the alleged release barred my claims. Their

fraud regarding those material facts is discussed in detail

in the next Section.

        The fraud involved in the purported release will be

discussd in more detail in a future Section.

       V.  N.C. attorneys Crawford, Glover and Mallonee

made numerous false statements denying NCDOT

responsibility for the destruction and the taking of my

property in N.C.  They also repeatedly misrepresented

material facts.  Their tangled webs of deceit are so

convoluted that it is difficult to untangle them.  In the

federal courts, Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover

fraudulently stated that the damage to my property was:

         " event: a 'minor landslide' on or about June 1995."  Appellee's Brief (04-1649), p. 3, lines 4-6 (Statement #6)

        Statement #6  directly contradicts statements by

several NCDOT engineers and N.C. attorney

T.L. Mallonee, who has and/or is serving under Roy

Cooper, in the N.C. Dept. of "Justice."  Statement #6

is directly contradicted by the following:

       "The Complaint itself states that ..the aforementioned  actions and inactions caused a series of landslides, beginning around July 1st, 1995, which rendered the property useless." T.L. Mallonee, Transcript, Langdon v. NCDOT (98-cvs-139), p. 3, March 15th, 1999 (Statement #7)

       "..the landslides in question."  id at p. 5, line 5 (Statement #8)

       "Now he indicates that there was a series of landslides that culminated in his property being rendered useless."  id at p. 5, lines 15-17 (Statement #

       "...regardless of how small the very first slide may have been, significant slope failure had occurred by mid-July, 1995."  T.L. Mallonee, Defendant-Appellee's Brief, p. 16, Langdon v. NCDOT (Statement #9)

       "..significant slope failure, or sliding, had occurred on the Plaintiff's property."  Affidavit, NCDOT engineer J.J. Swain (2-20-99) (Statement # 10)

        "The earth mass on Mr. Langdon's property has shown signs of movement over the last year or so."  Report of NCDOT engineer F.D. Martin (3-29-96) (Statement #11) .

        An engineer that I hired also agreed that the damage to

my property was significant and occurred over along period

 of time.

         "The amount of property adversely affected by the slope failure was considerably greater in January 1999 than when first observed in August, 1995."  Report of William Matthews, engineer (1-08-02) (Statement #12)

       Clearly, the damage to my property was significant and

occured over a long period of time.  The damage was not

the result of single, minor landslide occurring in June, 1995,

as fraudulently alleged by Roy Cooper, Crawford and

Glover in Statement # 6, supra. 

       Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover denied any NCDOT

responsibility for the taking (or the destruction) of my

property before the Fourth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme


        ""NCDOT and its employees consistently denied any responsibility for the landslide or landslides.."  Appellee's Brief (01-1975, 4th Cir.), Langdon v. Swain, pp. 7-8 (Statement #13)

       When I first approached the NCDOT about this

situation, the NCDOT engineers fraudulently denied any

NCDOT responsibilty.  When I filed a Complaint for the

taking of my property against the NCDOT (Langdon v.

NCDOT) in the state courts, NCDOT attorney  Mallonee

made several false statements denying NCDOT

responsibility.  He flip-flopped between denying that a

taking had occurred and alleging that it was barred by a

statute of limitations.

         "The Defendant-Appellee [the NCDOT] therefore submits that came forward...establishing that the Plaintiff-Appellant's action accrued in July 1995."  T.L. Mallonee, Defendant-Appellees' Brief, Langdon v. NCDOT, p. 16 (1-03-00) (Statement #14)

       In layman's terms, Mallonee was asserting that the

taking of my property occurred in July, 1995.  I agree that

there was a taking [destruction] of my property, but at a

later date.  If the taking of my property did occur, as

alleged by NCDOT attorney Mallonee, why did Roy

Cooper, Crawford and Glover deny that a taking had

occurred?   Why did the NCDOT and its engineers deny

in July, 1995, and afterwards that there was a taking? 

      A cause of action accrues when one has the right to

sue.  Mallonee alleged that my right to sue for a taking of

my property accrued in July 1995.  Roy Cooper, Crawford

and Glover deny that I had the right to sue, and deny that

there was a taking. 

       N.C. Department of Justice attorney Mallonee

succeeded in the state courts by alleging that:  the damage

to my property was significant;  my property was

rendered useless; the damage was the result of a series of

slides;  and that my cause of action for a taking

of my property without just compensation accrued in mid-

July, 1995.

       Cooper, Crawford and Glover succeeded in the federal

courts by alleging that:  the damage to my property was

minor;  the damage resulted from a single slide; and that

my cause of action for a taking never accrued.

        Therefore, the N.C. Department of Justice has taken

exactly opposite positions, as to material facts, in

different court proceedings.  They have a habit of saying

whatever is to their advantage at the time, regardless of

how false it may be. 

       I have given Cooper, Crawford, Glover, and Mallonee

numerous opportunities to correct their fraud, but they

have refused to do so.  The courts, state and federal, have

simply ignored their fraud.  Apparently, if you go into court

without an attorney, you have no rights. 

      VI.  Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover perpetrated

fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts

regarding the default of the Defendants in Langdon v.

Swain, Martin & Murdock, the three NCDOT engineers

who were responsible for the taking of my property,

committed fraud, blocked my right of meaningful access to

the courts, and destroyed my business.  The attorneys

fraudulently stated:

        "Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant had 'failed to plead or otherwise defend,' before his motions for default entry were filed.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). default entry was thus not appropariate and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion." Brief in Opposition (02-12), pages 10-11 (Statement #15).

      There is a great deal of fraud in that statement.  The

defendants failed to file a timely answer, therefore, they

were in default.



        "Rule 55.  Default (a) Entry.  When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default."  

       The entry of a default is mandatory, not discretionary,

as they fraudulently alleged.  "Shall" in statutes is mandatory,

"may" is permissive. 

         "..the defendants are in a position of having failed to plead or otherwise to defend within twenty days..They are therefore in default..there has been no entry of default...But that entry is a purely formal matter."  Orange County Theater Corp. v. Rayhertz Amusement Corp., 130 F. 2d 185, 187[2] (3rd Cir. 1942)

       " A party's default is not excused simply becuase it is not recorded in the docket."  Moore's Federal Practice, 3d Ed., Section 55.11 [5] (2000).

      The defendants filed a Rule 6 (b) motion for more time

that was mailed one day after the time for Murdock to

answer had expired. What the N.C. attorneys

fraudulently concealed from the Court was the fact

that their first motion contained factual errors and was

denied.  Even if the first motion could have removed

the default, it was mailed one day after the time for

Murdock to answer had expired.

      They filed subsequent Rule 6(b) motions for more

time to answer, one for Murdock and another for Swain

and Martin. Those motions could not have prevented

the default, as fraudulently alleged by the N.C.

attorneys, because they were mailed after the time to

answer had expired and they did not meet any of the

other requirements to prevent a default. 

      "Under no theory can a motion under Rule 30(b) extend a defendant's time to answer.  Rule 12(a) extends the time to serve a responsive pleading only when a motion is made that is permitted under Rule 12."   Atlantic Steamers Supply Co. v. International Maritime Supply Co., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1011 (SDNY 1967)

      See also:  Educational Services v. Maryland State

Board of Education, 710 F. 2d 170, 176-177

(4th Cir. 1983), citing Atlantic Steamers Supply,

supra.  A Rule 6(b) motion is not one of the motions

under Rule 12 that can prevent a default.  Under some

circumstances a Rule 6(b) motion may be construed as

a motion to set aside a default. However, it must meet

all of the requirements of said motion.

        "In order to vacate entry of default, the moving party must show: good causefor default;  quick action to correct it; and a meritorious defense."  Pretzel & Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters, 28 F. 3d 42, 43[2] (7th Cir. 1994)

      "Trial court properly required defendant.. to state underlying facts to support claim of meritorious defense."  Consolidated Masonry & Fireproof, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Co., 383 F. 2d 249 (4th Cir. 1967).

      The attorneys did not file an affidavit, as required,

nor an answer.

       "The defendant filed a written motion to set aside default and..the affidavit of general counsel.  However, no answer was tendered for filing."  id., at 251.

       Affidavits are required.   Thompson v. Wooster,

114 U.S. 104, 5 S.Ct. 788 (1885);  Park Corp. v.

Lexington Insur. Co., supra;  Atlantic Steamers

Supply, supra.  The defendants did not utilize quick

action.  Quick action means the filing of an answer, or

a motion to set aside a default, supported by affidavits,

alleging a meritorious defense, and providing a rational,

acceptable reason for the default.  Crawford, Cooper,

and Glover failed to explain why there was a

miscalculation of the response date, who made it,

and who handled the Complaint, as required, before

a default may be set aside.  See: Park Corp. supra;

Heyman v. M.L. Market Co., 116 F. 3d 91 (4th Cir.

1997);  Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc.49 F.R.D. 139

(SDNY 1970).

        In Statement #16, supra, the N.C. attorneys

fraudulently alleged that I could not show that they had

failed to "plead or otherwise defend."  Rule 55 states:

"plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules."

That refers to an answer, or one of the motions allowed

under Rule 12 of the Fed. Rules of Civ. P.

      "The words 'otherwise defend' refer to the interposition of various challenges to such matters as service, venue and the sufficiency of the prior pleading, any of which might prevent a default if pursued in the absence of a responsive pleading."  Federal Practice & Procedure, Vol. 10A, Section 2682, p. 15-16, Wright , Miller & Kane (1998).

       The N.C. attorneys met none of the criteria to

prevent, or, to set aside the default.  They perpetrated

fraud on the courts by mis-representing the law regarding

defaults and by failing to cite the contrary case law.

        " advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction."  Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.

        The N.C. attoneys fraudulently attempted to blame

the defaults on Murdock.  They alleged that:

       "Mr. Murdock mistakenly disposed of Plaintiff's Complaint when first received by him, as he beleived it was related to an earlier case filed by Plaintiff in state court."  Statement #17.

       Murdock did not mistakenly throw out the summons

and Complaint.  He deliberately threw them out, although

he knew that they were legal documents.  Murdock did not

want to respond.  Furthermore, the N.C. attorneys had a

copy of the Complaint ten days before the time to answer.

Therefore, they knew that Murdock was a defendant. 

Statement #17 does not explain the failure of any of the

defendants to plead or otherwise defend.  Magistrate

Judge Cogburn was derelict in his duties by not entering

the default.  The Fourth Circuit was derelict in its duty

in upholding Cogburn.  They accepted the fraudulent

position of the N.C. attorneys without question.

       What is bizarre about all of this is that the N.C.

courts did not consider my federal claims under

42 U.S.C. 1983.  If they had, my claims could not have

been barred by any limitations, even if they took the

fraudulent date alleged by Mallonee for the taking, 

mid-July 1995.  My state Complaint was filed in June

1998, less than three years later. The statute of

limitations for suits under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is three years. 

In their pleadings in the federal courts, the N.C.

attorneys never denied this allegation, nor did they deny

that: I did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate

my claims in the prior state case;  and that the purported

judgment in the state case is void.

         I have given the crooked lawyers, Roy Cooper,

Crawford and Glover nin emonths to deny the charges

herein and they have failed to do so.  They have never

asked for a retraction of the allegations.  What kind of

"legal system" do we have in this country? 

       What's bizarre about all of this is that Cooper has spent

more of the tax payer's money depriving me of my rights

 than it would have cost to fix the problem, which is still a

threat to motorists and will have to be fixed someday