How the NCDOT destroyed my property, covered it up, and got away with it (so far).          The North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) is responsible for the destruction of the value of my 6.83 acres of land in PolkCounty, North Carolina, near the Town of Tryon.  The property has spectacular mountain views but has been rendered useless because NCDOT engineers J.J. Swain, Jack Murdock, Dave Henderson and F.D. Martin failed to perform their fiduciary duties to properly maintain the NCDOT's right of way [NCSR 1116, a.k.a. "Hogback Mtn. Rd."] that traverses  my property.  I was unable to obtain just compensation for the taking [destruction] of my property because of fraud and deceit by NCDOT engineers Swain, Henderson, Murdock and Martin.  Swain, Murdock and other NCDOT engineers also libeled and/or slandered me and destroyed my business in the process. Swain also illegally denied me access to pertinent NCDOT construction records, contrary to the N.C. Public Records law.           NCDOT attorney T.L. Mallonee, a.k.a. T. "Liar" Mallonee, used fraud, and fraud on the courts, to prevent me from obtaining just compensation for my property. A review of the pertinent events will bear out these  accusations.         On, or about, July 1st, 1995, a small (15 sq. ft.) chunk of dirt broke loose from the NCDOT's bank, located within its right of way.  A former NCDOT employee warned me that, if the NCDOT did not take corrective measures within its right of way, there would be subsequent slides that would eventually destroy my property beyond the NCDOT's right of way.           Therefore, I asked the NCDOT District Engineer at the time, J.J. Swain, to take corrective, preventative measures within the NCDOT's right of way.  He refused. Instead, he recommended that I take corrective measures within the NCDOT's right of way.  He recommended that I build a railroad tie retaining wall to shore up the improperly sloped bank, and that I move the outlet of the NCDOT's drainpipe that is located above the NCDOT's improperly sloped bank.          In a letter dated July 26th, 1995, Swain again recommended that I move the outlet of the NCDOT's drainpipe.   He told me that I had to get the NCDOT's permission before undertaking any work within the NCDOT's right of way. Swain attached a letter from   NCDOT engineer Dave Henderson to his letter.  Henderson's letter also recommended that I move the outlet of the NCDOT's drainpipe.  Swain and Henderson fraudulently denied any NCDOT responsibility.        Of course, why move the NCDOT's drainpipe if it is not a factor in the collapse of the NCDOT's bank?  Why build a retaining wall within the NCDOT's right of way, if the bank was properly constructed?  Under N.C. law, the maintenance of  the NCDOT's right of way is the responsibility of the NCDOT, not the citizens!  It's clear that they wished to trick me into taking responsibility for their problem by undertaking their responsibilities.  In his letter to me, he referred to it as your problem.       The engineers that I hired determined that the NCDOT's bank was not sloped according to acceptable engineering standards, and that the NCDOT's drainpipe added hydrostatic (water) pressure to the improperly sloped bank.  They agreed that if corrective measures were not taken, there would be future slides on my property beyond the NCDOT's right of way.  I sent their reports to the NCDOT engineers.         The NCDOT, and NCDOT engineer Swain,  prevented me from viewing the NCDOT's construction records for its easement traversing my property.  However, I learned later that their denial of my access to the records  was illegal and in violation of the N.C. Public Records Law.  I also learned later that the NCDOT's bank was not sloped according to the NCDOT's Design Manual, a fact which the NCDOT and its engineers (Swain, Henderson, Martin, Murdock and others) intentionally, fraudulently concealed from me.          There was a great deal of illegality and fraud, regarding the concealing of the relevant NCDOT construction records, by NCDOT attorneys Mallonee and Crawford.  They were working for Michael Easley at the time, when he was the N.C. Attorney General.  Therefore, he shares responsibility for their fraud.     The engineers that I hired to assess the situation stated that the causes of the slides within the NCDOT's right of way were: the steepness of the NCDOT's bank; and the NCDOT's drainpipe.  I sent their reports to the NCDOT  but they still refused to take corrective, preventative  measures within their right of way.  At the suggestion of Swain, I contacted the N.C. Dept. of Health, Environment and Natural Resources.  Mr. Beck from that department viewed the situation.  He concluded that: I hadn't broken any environmental laws; and that the NCDOT's drainpipe was the main cause of the slides within the NCDOT's right of way.          In the summer of 1997, an area of my property had been physically destroyed by the slides, which had progressed beyond the NCDOT's right of way.  I had a surveyor measure the area that had been destroyed by the slides.  I then asked him to draw a line through the NCDOT's drainpipe and down through the destroyed area. The line divided the destroyed land into two almost exactly equal areas, which proves that the NCDOT's drainpipe was a prime cause for the slides. This information, along with my engineering reports,  were sent to the NCDOT, to no avail.             J.J. Swain, Jack Murdock, F.D. Martin, and other NCDOT engineers made false statements that indicated, or strongly implied, that I was responsible for the slides.  Many of their statements contradicted each other, and even themselves.  I filed suit against them in the N.C. Industrial Commission (NCIC). Their attorney, Michael Warren, made inconsistent defensive arguments in a hearing.  He argued that the defendants hadn't libeled me.  He also argued that I couldn't recover because the libelous statements were false, and the engineers knew they were false when they made them. The NCIC only allows for the recovery of damages for negligent acts. The magistrate made Warren elect one of the inconsistent defenses.  He elected the defense that the engineers intentionally made false statements that blamed me for the slides.          I then reached a small settlement agreement with Warren for the libel/slander  The agreement was to release the libel claims.  However, when I received the agreement, I discovered that additional, new items had been added.  I asked Warren why, and he stated that the new items were added at the request of NCDOT attorney T.L. Mallonee. That surprised me becauseWarren had told me that Mallonee was not involved in the case.  Mallonee's additions to the agreement required me not to seek damages from the NCDOT, or its employees, for any damage to my property, resulting from a landslide of June, 1995, except in my  lawsuit filed in N.C. (Langdon v. NCDOT, 98-CVS-139).        I agreed to the terms with the understanding that I would get a full and fair hearing in Langdon v. NCDOT.  I did not get a full and fair hearing in Langdon v. NCDOT. Also, my complaint (Langdon v. NCDOT) was for damages from a series of slides (not one), beginning in July, 1995. It did not allege any damage from a slide (singular) in June, 1995.      There was no additional compensation for the additional items in the settlement agreement.  Furthermore, NCDOT attorney Mallonee had consented, before I signed the release, to depositions of the NCDOT engineers involved in this matter.  However, after the purported settlement (release), Mallonee began dodging my phone calls.  He eventually informed me that he was reneging on the agreement for depositions.        I would not have agreed to the release if I had known that Mallonee was going to renege on the agreement for depositions.  I wouldn't have signed the release if I had known that T. "Liar" Mallonee had illegally removed the pertinent NCDOT engineering records, from the  NCDOT's district office in Henderson County, to his office in Asheville, N.C. (Buncombe County).  The NCDOT district engineer, E. Green, faciltated the illegal removal of the records, contrary to the N.C. Public Records Law.       Because the NCDOT failed to take corrective, preventative measures within its right of way (r.o.w.), I filed a Complaint in the superior court of Polk County, N.C. (case no. 98-CVS-139) in June of 1988,  I alleged that the NCDOT had taken my property without just compensation and due process of law, in violation of the N.C. Constitution, Article I, Sections 18 & 19, and the U.S. Constitution, Amendments V & XIV.             In his answer to Langdon v. NCDOT, T.L. Mallonee fraudulently referred to the damage of a "landslide" (singular). My suit correctly asserted that the damage to my property was the result of a series of landslides.  Mallonee also fraudulently denied any NCDOT responsibility and pled a statute of limitations (NCGS 136- 111).  However, a plea of limitations  presupposes that a cause of action has accrued.         ''The plea of limitations presuposes the existence of a right of action which has become barred by the lapse of time, while the plea of a prescriptive right denies that the alleged right ever existed."  Hume v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 158 NW 840[4] (Mich. 1916).        "...stautes of limitation pre-suppose an established substantive right, but forbid the plaintiff from enforcing it."   34 Am. Jur., Limitations of Actions, Section 410, p. 322 (1941)        "Statute of limitations bar claim which has arisen." Olympic Products Co. v. Roof Systems, Inc., 339 S.E. 2d 432 [2] (N.C. App.1986).        Therefore, the two defenses are inconsistent.  There is N.C. case law that holds that a defendant may not plead a limitations, and deny that a taking has occured/and or deny the plaintiff's ownership of the property in question.  See: Mason v. Commissioners of Durham County, 96 S.E. 110, 111 (N.C. 1918);  Whiting Manufacturing Co. v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 175 S.E. 698 (N.C. 1934);  Kistler v. City of Raleigh, 136 S.E. 78, 80 [1] (N.C. 1964).  Mallonee's answer in Langdon v. NCDOT denied  a taking had occured and, for reasons unkown, denied my ownership.         The denial of a taking and a plea of limitations by Mallonee in Langdon v. NCDOT are inconsistent defenses. Even if they could have been pled under N.C. law, they were not pled in the hypothetical, nor in the alternative, therefore, they should have canceled each other out. Schott Motorcycle Supply Co. v. American Honda Motor Co., 976 F. 2d 58 (1st Cir. 1992).       The plea of limitations was not properly made because it did not allege a date that my cause of action accrued.           I believe that Mallonee wished to conceal the fact that the plea of limitations was an admission that my cause of action for a taking of my property had accrued.                     Mallonee's answer also intentionally mis-represented the law.  He fraudulently stated that the right to just compensation for the taking of property was a right created by statute (NCGS 136-111).  In reality, the right to just compensation goes back 800 years and pre-dates the Magna Charta.  The N.C. Supreme Court, in many of its earliest, most important decisions, acknowledged the right as implied in the first N.C. Constitution, and in its subsequent revisions, and was derived from the Magna Charta. See:  Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C.58, 73-80 (1805).         "The right to just compensation is an ancient one.  it reaches back before the Magna Carta and forms a part of the common law."  Karp v. Urban Development Commission of Stamford,  294 A. 2d 633, 635 [5,6].        The right to just compensation is also included in the U.S. Constitution, Amendments V & XIV.  I believe that Mallonee fraudulently asserted that just compensation was a right created by statute to make it seem that the stautory remedy (NCGS 136-111) was the exclusive remedy.  Mallonee never supplied any case law that indicates that  NCGS 136-111 was the exclusive remedy for a taking of property without just compensation.        Mallonee filed a motion for summary judgment that alleged that my Complaint was barred by an alleged statute of limitations.  His motion did not contain a denial of NCDOT responsibility, therefore, Mallonee had waived any reliance by the NCDOT on that defense.  Mallonee elected the purported defense of a limitations.  See: Alpar v. Weyerhauser Co., Inc., 201 S.E. 2d 503, 503-04 (N.C. App. 1974) (election of a defense must be made before trial).  Once a position has been taken, a party may not change that position later.          I responded to the NCDOT's motion for summary judgment with two pleadings that alleged that my Complaint, Langdon v. NCDOT, was filed in June, 1998, nine months after the taking of my property in September, 1997, when I was denied a septic tank permit for the property.  Therefore, my cause of action could not be barred by the purported 2 years limitation in NCGS 136-111, if it had been properly pled.          I also filed several motions:  a motion to amend my Complaint;  a motion for a jury trial; a motion to join the note-holders and trustees; and a motion to compel discovery.  The motions were properly noticed for the same day as the NCDOT's motion for summary judgment.        The motion to amend asked for leave to amend my Complaint to allege that the taking had occurred in September, 1997.  My original Complaint didn't allege a specific date for the taking.  The motion was un-opposed, therefore, it should have been granted.  Motions to amend are to be liberally granted, especially in pro se civil rights actions.        "A relaxed standard for the grant of leave to amend a complaint applies with particular force to a pro se litigants, and a pro se complaint is to be read liberally, and should not be dismissed without granting leave to amend at least once..."   C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, Section 400, pp. 373-74       "A plaintiff may be allowed to amend the complaint in order to show facts which mitigate against a defense, such as limitations..."  C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, Section 414, p. 388.        The motion to compel discovery was necessary because Mallonee had reneged on my discovery request. I wish to depose several NCDOT engineers and have them bring the construction records to the depositions.  At that time I was not aware that Mallonee had illegally removed them from the NCDOT's district office to Mallonee's office.  My motion to compel discovery was un-opposed.  There was a court order requiring discovery.  Mallonee tricked me into delaying the depositions.  He asked me to delay the depositions because the witnesses were scattered across the state and the weather was bad in N.C. that January and February.  He then filed his motion for summary judgemnt and reneged on the agrement for depositions.        My motion to join the noteholders and trustees was made because, under N.C. law,  they are necessary parties in a suit for just compensation.          "In view of complaint, in inverse condemnation action..trial court properly ordered joinder of trustee and noteholder...Long v. City of Charlotte, 293 S.E. 2d 101 (N.C. 1982)."  29A C.J.S., Section 398, p. 783, n. 75 (1992).          "Trustee and Noteholder Necessary Parties in Inverse Condemnation Action ..Long v. City of Charlotte."  General Statutesof North Carolina, Annotated, Vol. I, Section 1A-1, Rule 19, p. 883, notation, Matthew Bender & Co.., Lexis-Nexis Publishing (2002)          If the necessary parties are not joined, any purported judgment is void.  J & B Slurry Seal v. Mid-South Aviation, 363 S.E. 2d 812, 813 [10] (N.C. App. 1987).  The joinder of necessary parties can't be waived.  Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co. v. Stephenson,  387 S.E. 2d 77, 78 [1] (N.C.App. 1990)  The motion to join the necessary parties was un-opposed, and according to N.C. law, could not be denied.       My motion for a jury trial should have been granted because it was un-opposed and a plaintiff has a right to have a jury determine issues of fraud.  The NCDOT engineers perpetrated fraud to prevent me from filing a suit for just compensation.  Also, under N.C. law, a plaintiff has the right to have disputed issues of fact resolved by a jury.         The motions were scheduled for March 15th, 1999.  In court that day I answered "here" when my name was called. The presiding judge noticed that I had a box with me.  He sarcastically asked if it contained more motions.  That clearly demonstrated his bias against me and my motions. The Judge, Claude Sitton, asked Mallonee if my case could be moved to the end of the session, and Mallonee agreed. Sitton didn't ask me if it was OK, once again demonstrating his bias.        Mallonee argued at the hearing that my Complaint was barred by a purported limitations, NCGS 136-111, although my Complaint was not filed under that statute.  Mallonee did not supply any case law that alleged that NCGS 136- 111 is the exclusive remedy for a taking.          Mallonee also fraudulently denied any NCDOT responsibility for the taking. Mallonee's denial of a taking was waived when he filed his motion for a summary judgment based on a limitations only.  That was an election of a defense of a limitations.  Once a defense is elected, a party may not switch to another defense later.  However, at the so called hearing (3-15-05) Mallonee was arguing a purported defense for the NCDOT that had been waived.          Also, as stated previously herein, Under N.C, law, a defendant may not deny that a taking has occurred and allege a limitations.  Those inconsistent arguments were not made in the alternative, nor the hypothetical, therefore, they should have cancelled each other out.        Mallonee's oral argument contradicted his anser by conceding that there was a series of slides on my property, beginning on July 1st, 1995.  He fraudulently concealed the fact that those slides began within the NCDOT's right of way.  They did not occur on my property beyond the right of way until 1996. During his argument, Mallonee did not allege a date for the taking.  He argued that the statute of limitations for a taking runs from the first injury, although the statute that purportedly barred my claim, NCGS 136-111, states that the limitation runs from the taking, not the first injury.         Mallonee's motion for summary judgment was supported by a false affidavit by Swain.  It appears that Mallonee wrote the affidavit for Swain.  Swain alleged in his affidavit that:       "..as of mid-July, 1995, significant slope failure, or sliding had occured on the Plaintiff's property and clear evidence existed..that additional failure would occur if corrective measures were not taken by the Plaintiff."  Affidavit, J.J. Swain, p. 2, Section 10 (2/20/99)         That is an admission that Swain, the NCDOT District Engineer at the time, knew in July, 1995, that if corrective, preventative, measures were not taken, serious damage would occur to my property.  What Swain's affidavit fraudulently conceals, with the help of Mallonee, is the fact that those corrective, preventative measures were those that had to be undertaken within the NCDOT's r.o.w., the responsibility of the NCDOT.  Swain's verbal recommendations, his letter of July 26th, 1995 and the  accompanying letter of NCDOT engineer Swain prove that.        Swains allegation that the damage to my property was significant by mid-July, 1995, is intentionally false.  I believe that he and Mallonee intended to imply that the taking occurred in mid-July, 1995.  Later statements by Mallonee susbtantiate my allegations.  Neither before, nor during the hearing of March 15th, 1999, did Mallone ever allege that the taking ocured by mid-July, 1995, or by any date. Mallonee appeared not to want to do anything that would admit that a taking had ocurred, i.e., allege a date for a taking.         I demonstrated in my pleadings opposing summary judgment that the first slide was within the NCDOT's r.o.w. and was small, 15 sq, ft. out of the almost 300,000 sq. ft, that was taken. The first slide was on, or about Ju1y 1st, 1995.  A second, smaller slide occurred within the NCDOT's right of way several weeks later, in late August, or early September.  The first slide outside of the NCDOT's  r.o.w didn't occur until 1996.  I did not file suit then because I expected more slides, and the damage was not signifiant enough to be a taking.  Both federal and N.C. law require that there be a substantial diminution in market value to be considered a taking.   I testified at the "hearing" that: the taking did not occur until September, 1997; the first slide was small and within the NCDOT's right of way; and that Swain's affidavit was perjury. Mallonee never disputed my testimony, except to object to my testifying, without stating why he was objecting, as required. The judge over-ruled him and allowed me to continue to testify. At the hearing I presented to the judge the appropriate case law that states that the note-holders and trustees are necessary parties and must be joined to a suit for just compensation. I also presented to him a list of the note- holders and trustees having a security interest in my property at the time of the taking. I made NCDOT attorney Mallonee aware of the noteholders and trustees well in advance of the hearing. It should also be noted that Mallonee was seeking a summary judgment based on the purported limitations in NCGS 136-111. NCDOT attorney Mallonee must have been well aware that before proceeding under NCGS 136-111, it is necessary for the court to proceed under NCGS 136-108. That statute requires the court to join any necessary parties, determine if a taking has occurred, and if so, what property was "taken," none of which was done. Mallonee denied that there was taking while pleading the inconsistent defense of a limitations. He perpetrated fraud on the court because he must have known that the court had to undertake the procedures under NCGS 136- 108 before proceeding under NCGS 136-111. Because the court did not undertake the procedures required under 136- 108, it lacked jurisdiction to proceed under 136-111. Mallonee knew that, but kept quiet. Cooper, Crawford and Glover are aware that the court lacked jurisdiction in the state case, Langdon v. NCDOT, but they have used it to prevent me from obtaining relief in Langdon v. Swain and Langdon v. Tippett. They have also prevented me from getting relief from the alleged judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT, although they know it is void and was procured through fraud and fraud on the court. Their reliance on the purported judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT in the federal and state courts is fraud on those courts.       I also presented case law to the court that proves that there is no statute of limitations for a taking without just compensation in N.C . "As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has indicated, there is no statute of limitations applicable to a claim for just compensation. Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 172 S.E. 2d 1 (1970). If Plaintiff's property has been taken by defendants, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation under the N.C. Constitution regardless of when the taking occurred. The time of the taking is relevant only for purposes of valuing the 'just comppensation due." Ocean Acres v. Dare County Board of Health, 514 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D.N.C. 1981), affirmed 707 F. 2d 103 at 103 [3] (4th Cir. 1983)         The trial judge (Sitton) cut the so-called "hearing" short because he was hungry. He did end the session with a promise to review the entire case file. A few days later he entered summary judgment for the NCDOT without ruling on any of my motions. No explanation was given for his purported ruling, and his order failed to even mention my motions. He didn't address a single issue raised by me. He merely stated that my Complaint was barred by a statute of limitations, although the N.C. Supreme Court has ruled that there is no staute of limitations for a suit for just compensation for the taking of property. NCDOT attorney Mallonee succeeded on a purported limitations, although he never alleged a date for the taking. I alleged that the taking occured in September, 1997, in my: pleadings opposing summary judgment; in my un-opposed motion to amend; and in my testimony at the summary judgment "hearing." At no time did Mallonee allege any date for the taking. Therefore, the court should have accepted the un-disputed date that I alleged for the taking, September, 1997. Mallonee's only argument at the "hearing" was that the purported limitations runs from the first act in the taking. However, when the first injury is minor, there is no taking. "Minor physical intrusion is not 'physical taking' for purposes of takings clause." Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F. 2d 84, 85 [7] (2nd Cir. 1992). The problem I was confronted with was to determine at what point the damage to my property rose to the level of a taking. Even Swain admitted in his affidavit, supra, that the damage to my property was not complete by mid-July, 1995. I supplied to the court case law holding that, when the taking occurs over a period of time, any statute of limitations (if there is one) runs from the last act in the taking, when the taking is complete, not the first act. That way, a plaintiff does not have to file suit when each instance of damage occurs. The damage to my property resulted from a series of slides over a long period of time, which NCDOT-NCDOJ attorney Mallonee admitted. However, NCDOT-NCDOJ attorneys Cooper, Crawford and Glover fraudulently stated in the federal courts that there was only a single, minor slide involved (See page 1).         The Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in U.S. v. Dickinson where the U.S. government flooded a man's property for over six years. The government tried to weasel out of paying him by alleging that the six year limitation had run. The court held that: " The Government could, of course, have taken appropriate proceedings to condemn as early as it chose..it could have fixed the time when the property was 'taken.' [It] chose not to do so. It left the taking to physical events thereby putting on the owner the onus of determining the decisive moment in the process of acquisition by the United States when the the fact of the taking could no longer be in controversy.. We are not now called upon to decide whether in a situation like this a landowner might be allowed to bring a suit as soon as inundation threatens. Assuming that such an action would be sustained, it is not a good enough reason why he must sue then, or have, from that moment, the staute of limitations run against him. If suit must be brought, lest he jeopardize his rights, as soon as his land is invaded, other contingencies would be running against him--for instance, the uncertainty of damage and the risk of res judicata against recovering later for damage as yet uncertain. The source of the entire claim..is not a single event; it is continuous..there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine, to preclude the law from meeting such a process by postponing suit until the situation becomes stabilized..when dealing with a problem which arises under such diverse circumstances procedural rigidities should be avoided...when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation for what is really "taken."  U.S. v. Dickinson, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 1385 (1947).       See also: Mac Donald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986) reaffirming the "Dickinson" rule.  In Swain's affidavit, supplied by NCDOT attorney Mallonee to the court at the summary judgment hearing on 3-15-99, Swain stated that he warned me in July, 1995, that future damage would occur to my property if corrective measures were not taken. That proves that the taking was not complete by mid-July, 1995, and, according to the Dickinson rule, no staute of limitations could begin to run by mid-July, 1995, because the taking was not complete. NCDOT attorney Mallonee never alleged that the taking was complete by July, 1995, nor did he allege any date for the taking. He argued that the purported limitations ran from the first injury, not the last, contrary to the Dickinson rule.        However, the U.S. Supreme Court based its decision in Dickinson on Amendment V, U.S. Constitution, which requires fairness (Due Process of Law). States courts are required to supply at least the minimum amount of fairness (due process) embodied in Amendment V. Also, my Complaint sought relief under the U.S. Constitution, Amendments V & XIV. "Taking's" claims under Amendment XIV may be heard directly under the Constitution, or under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983. See: Ocean Acres v. Dare Cnty., supra. The staute of limitations for Section 1983 suits in N.C. is three years. My Complaint, Langdon v. NCDOT, was filed less than three years after the initial slide in the NCDOT's right of way. Therefore, if Mallonee had alleged that the taking had occurred by mid-July, 1995, the taking still would not have been barred by the limitations for Section 1983 suits. The trial court never considered my federal claims (Amendments V & XIV, Section 1983).         In his answer, Mallonee referred to a landslide (singular), implying that the taking occured by a single event.  Since the first slide occured, on or about, July 1st, 1995, Mallonee was implying that the taking had occurred on July 1st, 1995. At the summary judgment "hearing," Judge Sitton stated that he believed that Mallonee's position was that I had alleged in my Complaint that the taking had occured on July, 1st, 1995. I pointed out that my Complaint had alleged that the taking had occured by a series of slides that began on, or about, July, 1st, 1995. My Complaint never alleged a date for the taking, which I attempted to correct by my Motion to Amend, which alleged September, 1997, as the date for the taking. Mallonee did nothing to correct Judge Sittons mis- conception, fostered by Mallonee, that I had alleged that the taking had occured on July, 1st, 1995. Mallonee's silence on the issue was also fraud on the court because he could have corrected the mis-representation of my Complaint. On appeal, Mallonee fraudulently assered that the taking occured in mid-July, 1995, not July 1st, 1995, as he misled the trial court.       If the court had taken my un-disputed date for the taking, September, 1997, my Complaint could not have been barred by the alleged two year limitations in NCGS- 136-111 because my Complaint was filed nine months later, in June, 1998.  If the court had considered my claims under Amendments V & XIV (Section 1983), my Complaint could not have been barred because it was filed well within three years of the taking.  Even if the taking had occurred on July 1st, 1995, as fraudulently implied, but never pled, or argued, by Mallonee, then my federal claims could not have been barred because my Complaint was filed in June, 1998, less than three years later.        The entry of summary judgment was improper for those reasons and because: necessary parties were not joined, rendering the judgment void; the court had not ruled on my motions; the court did not apply the Dickinson rule; the court did not consider my federal claims; the NCDOT did not dispute the date that I had alleged for the taking, and my Complaint was filed nine mos. after the undisputed date for the taking; I testified that Swain's affidavit was perjury; I was not allowed to depose Swain, or any other NCDOT engineer; there was no meaningful discovery; Mallonee pepretrated fraud on the court by changing his position as to a material fact (the number of slides); Mallonee perpetrated fraud on the court by supporting his motion for a summary judgment with a false affidavit by Swain, by implying that the taking ocuured on July 1st, 1995, and by not correcting that mis- conception at the hearing; no evidence was presented that NCGS-136-111 is an exclusive remedy for a taking, as fraudulently implied by Mallonee; the court failed to draw all inferences in my favor; the court did not consider that fraud by a fiduciary prevents the running of a statute of limitations;  and the trial court failed to consider a single issue raised by me.        Additionally, the pleaings of pro se parties are to be liberally construed, especially in civil rights complaints, like mine. See:  Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596 (1972). The trial court failed to liberally construe my Complaint.       I appealed the court's purported ruling and a "hearing" was set to settle the Record on Appeal had by telephone. No record of the proceeding was kept, which is a violaiton of due process of law. Mallonee had some of my evidence opposing summary judgment excluded from the Record on Appeal, without an explanation by the judge. After the purported settling of the Record on Appeal, Mallonee had an ex parte conversation with the trial judge. In that conversation, Mallonee got the judge to effectively remove all of my remaining evidence opposing summary judgment, without a full explanation. Ex parte conversations are a violation of the N.C. Canon of Judicial Conduct. It must be assumed that Mallonee was aware that his ex parte conversation was illegal and unethical, and, therefore, it was fraud on the court. Mallonee's purported changes to the Record on Appeal, fraudulently accepted by the judge after the Record on Appeal had been settled at the purported hearing, intentionally deprived me of due process of law and equal protection under the law.       By the time I learned of the ex parte conversation and Mallonee's and Sittton's fraud, the time to perfect my appeal had almost expired. Therefore, I had no choice but to proceed with the appeal. Neither Mallonee, nor the NCDOT, have denied these allegations.        While my appeal was pending, I filed a motion seeking depositions and discovery pending appeal, because the court had not ruled on my motion to compel discovery and depositions.  Rule 27 of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled to "Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal."  Clearly, I was allowed to seek depositions.  However, Mallonee instructed the trial court administrator not to place my motions on the docket, although they had been properly noticed.  The trial court adminstrator, Jerry Brewer, complied with Mallonee's request and unilaterally ruled that the court no longer had  jurisdiction, which he had no authority to do.  Cooper,  Glover and Crawford later fraudulently alleged in federal court that Brewer was acting under the orders of the trial judge.        Mallonee's surreptitious, ex parte conversation, and his blocking of my right to a hearing on my motions were intentional acts designed to deprive me of my rights to:  due process of law; equal protection under the law; and meaingful access to the courts.  Mallonee had Sitton defraud me of my right to present a defense to the NCDOT's motion for summary judgment.  Any purported judgment entered without a true hearing is void.  Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S.Ct. 841 (1897);  Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 277.  Sham proceedings, like those I was subject to, are not constitutionally adequate.  Therefore, the purported judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT is void for a lack of due process of law.   It is also void because the necessary parties were not joined and no proceedings were held under NCGS 136-108, as required.         I wondered if the NCDOT was barring everyone from viewing the pertinent construction records, or, if only I was barred from viewing them.  I asked a friend to go to the NCDOT District Engineer's office to view and copy the records.  The new District Engineer, Ed Green, said OK.  That proved to me that the NCDOT was only barring me from viewing the records. When Green went to get the records they were gone.  Green then remembered that the records had been removed to T.L. Mallonee's office in Asheville, N.C.  NCDOT attorney Mallonee had the original records removed to his office, in violation of the N.C. Public Records Law.  The records were removed shortly after I filed my Complaint in June, 1998.         Mallonee still had the original records more than a year later.  I asked Mallonee to return the records to the office they were taken from, and to provide me copies of them. Both requests are provided for in the records law.  Mallonee ignored my requests, therefore, I filed suit to get certified copies of the record and to have the originals returned to the office where they are normally kept, as required by the records law.          NCDOT attorney Robert Crawford III defended the suit.  He had the former NCDOT district engineer, J. Swain, collect the purported records, take them to Swain's office in another district, and send me purported copies.  I objected because the copies were not certified.  Crawford refused to supply certified copies and responded with a lie, stating that:       "The Public Records Act does not require that 'certified' copies be provided.  Again, its our position that you have received eveything that you are entitled to under the Public Records Act."  Letter of Robert O. Crawford III, October 7th, 1999 (Statement #2).         That's a deliberate mis-representation of the law.         "Persons requesting copies of public records may request that the records be certified or uncertified."  N.C.G.S. Section 132-6.2.         I did receive copies of the purported records, however, they were purportedly certified by Mallonee and Green not Swain, the person who collected them and was in possession of them.  According to the records law, they were supposed to be certified by the official in control of them. Crawford refused to have Swain certify them and he refused to have Swain return them to the office they were taken from, in direct contravention to the records law.         I had originally asked to see the records back in 1995, but my request was denied by Swain.  The records were illegally removed by Mallonee and Green to Mallonee's office in 1998.  By 1999 I still had not received copies of the records that were certified by the official in control of them.  I dropped my suit because it was clear that whatever incriminating evidence that was in the records was destroyed.  Why else did they illegally conceal the records from me for over four years?         On appeal, I asked the N.C. Court of Appeals to allow  my evidence, opposing the summary judgment motion, into the Record on Appeal.  It had been accepted, and then illegally removed from the Record on Appeal, due to the collusion of Sitton and Mallonee in their ex parte conversation. It is error to grant summary judgment without ruling on a plaintiff's motions, as was done in my case.  See:  Carolina Builders v. Gelder & Associates, 289 S.E. 2d 628, 629 [2] (N.C.App. 1982).  It is a violation of a citizen's constitutional rights to deny one an opportunity to present  their case, or defend against a motion.       "The right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on motions filed in a lawsuit is critically important to the non-movant and cannot be considered an insubstantial ..omission on the part of the ..court." Pask v. Corbitt, 220 S.E. 2d at 382.          "Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend..This is a principle of natural justice.. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal."  Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876).       The N.C. Court of Appeals refused to allow my evidence into the Record on Appeal, without an explanation.  Of course, there was no legal, rational, explanation why my evidence was excluded.  They ignored the fact of Sitton's  illegal, ex parte conversation.  Apparently, in N.C. one's constitutional rights don't count if you don't have an attorney.  It is clear that Sitton's ex parte conversation with Mallonee was in violation of the N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(4).  Financial Services of Raleigh v. Barefoot, 594 S.E. 2d 37, 40 (N.C.App. 2004).             Before the N.C. Court of Appeals, Mallonee fraudulently stated:       "The Defendant-Appellee therefore submits that..it came forward..establishing that the Plaintiff-Appellant's action accrued in July, 1995."  T.L. Mallonee, Defendant-Appellee's Brief, Langdon v. NCDOT, p. 16 (January 3rd, 2000).         In the same brief, Mallonee denied that there was a taking.  If, as Mallonee alleged, he had established that my cause of action for a taking had accrued, how could he deny in the same brief that there was no taking? If the taking of my property had accrued in mid-July, 1995, why did the NCDOT engineers deny it in July, 1995, and subsequently?  Why was Mallonee allowed to flip-flop between two inconsistent positions, even after succeeding in one before the Superior Court?       I pointed out in my briefs that no statute of limitations can run when the cause of action is fraudulently concealed by a fiduciary. The NCDOT and its engineers and attorneys have a fiduciary duty to inform a citizen if they are responsible for the destruction (taking) of their property. The NCDOT and its engineers fradulently concealed the taking, thus preventing the running of any purported statute of limitations. The N.C. Court of Appeals, like the Superior Court, did not consider a single issue or argument raised by me.  Like the Superior Court, they drew all inferences against me, contrary to the law.  For example, I was uncertain as to what date to ask for interest from.  The taking took place over a two year period.  The NCDOT engineers knew on July 1st, 1995, that if corrective measures were not taken within the NCDOT's right of way that my property would be eventually destroyed.  I didn't believe that it was fair to not get interest for the time that the NCDOT sat by and failed to perform its fiduciary duties.  Therefore, I asked for interest from July 1st, 1995, when the cover-up began.  Federal courts hold that when a taking occurs over a period of time, as in my sitaution, rather than a single event, interest is calculated from the mid-point of the taking.  If I had asked for interest from the date that the taking was complete, Sept., 1997, I would have deprived myself of over a year's interest.        Alos, I had intended to amend my Complaint with claims against the engineers for fraud, etc., once I had deposed them.  Swain's fraud began about July 1st, 1995.           In any case, the N.C. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Therefore, I filed suit in federal court against the NCDOT engineers responsible for the taking, and/or covered it up:  Swain, Martin and Murdock.        I had filed a complaint against several NCDOT engineers in the N.C. state courts. I filed a motion to join the noteholders and trustees to the case.  The trial court administrator, Jerry Brewer, intentionally did not place the motion on the docket. He also failed to notify me of a  important, potentially dispositive hearing.  Brewer is the same individual who refused to place my motions for discovery and depositions, pending appeal, on the docket in Langdon v. NCDOT.     It was clear to me that I was unable to get a fair hearing in the N.C. courts, therefore, I took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.  I then filed my federal Complaint against several N.C.D.O.T. engineers, Langdon v. Swain, Martin and Murdock.  The fraud on the courts used to prevent me from getting a fair hearing in that case is presented on Page 1 at the top.  I also attempted to obtain relief from the purported judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT.  I was prevented from doing so by the illegal actions of Judge James Baker and fraud by the N.C. attorneys:  Cooper, Crawford and Glover.  Their actions are described on Page 3.