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II. The district court erroneously held that it had the
power to dismiss my Complaints, without notice and an
opportunity to be heard, under 28 U.S.C. 1915, the
In-Forma Pauperis Statute, and under Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 120 S.Ct. 2304 (2000). I was not given any oppor-
tunity to challenge the dismissals in the district court.
Before the Fourth Circuit, Cooper, Crawford and Glover
fraudulently alleged that the district court had the authority to
dismiss my Complaints via the In Forma Pauperis Statute
(28 U.S.C. 1915) although my Complaints were not filed
In Forma Pauperis, and I have never been a prisoner. No
other court has ever dismissed a non-prisoner, non-informa
pauperis, complaint via 28 U.S.C. 1915. Cooper failed to cite
any case law that supported his postion. He also failed
to cite the contrary, controlling case law that holds that the
legislative intent of 28 U.S.C. 1915, the In-Forma Pauperis
Statute, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
is to reduce the number of frivolous, in forma pauperis
lawsuits by prisoners. See: Roller v. Gunn, 107 F. 3d 227,
228, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1997); Crawford-El v. Britton,
525 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. at 1596 (1998). His failure to cite
the contrary, controlling case law is a violation of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and is fraud the Court.
In the U.S.Supreme Court, Cooper, Crawford and
Glover reversed themselves and admitted that the
dismissals were:
"..with a (perhaps erroneous) citation to 28 U.S.C. 1915. However, Plaintiff fails to show any abuse of discretion in the courts' exercise of their inherent powers to dismiss his Complaints.." Brief in Opposition (02-12), p. 7 (Statement # 5)
That statement fraudulently concealed from the U.S.
Supreme Court the fact that they had argued the opposite
before the Fourth Circuit Fraud #44), where they falsely
argued that the district court did have the authority to
dismiss my Complaints via 28 U.S.C. 1915.
In Statement #5, supra, Roy Cooper, Crawford and
Glover fraudulently stated that the courts had exercised
their "inherent powers" to dismiss my Complaints. That is
false. Neither the district court, nor the Fourth Circuit,
exercised their inherent powers in dismissing my
Complaints (Fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court #45).
Also, Cooper, Crawford and Glover failed to cite the
controlling case law which states that if the lower courts
did not exercise their inherent power, the issue is not
properly before the U.S. Supreme Court (Fraud #46).
"Respondents' contention that the federal courts posses inherent authority..will not be considered by this Court, since the lower courts did not invoke such authority in reaching their decisions." Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 297[3] (1989)
Roy Cooper, Crawford & Glover, are aware of
Mallard, they cited it on page 7 of their Brief.
They also fraudulently argued before the 4th Circuit
that the district court had the authority to dismiss my
Complaints under the authority of Arizona v. California, a
fact that they concealed from the Supreme Court (Fraud
#47). Arizona holds that a federal court may dismiss a
Complaint on its own motion, because of res judicata, if
it has previoulsy decided the same claim between the same
parties, and it has the record of the case. However, Arizona
did not apply to me because I had never filed any previous
claims against the defendants in Langdon v. Swain, or,
Langdon v. Tippett, in any federal court. The district court
dismissed my Complaints, purportedly, because of a prior
state court decision. The district court (Judge Thornburgh)
did not have a copy of the record of the prior state case,
nor any documents at all from the case.
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Cooper
abandoned any argument that the courts had authority to
dismiss my Complaints via Arizona and admitted that the
courts lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. 1915. When a
court acts, it must act under a valid authority, or, its
judgments are void. The district court purported to act
under 28 U.S.C. 1915 and Arizona, when it dismissed my
Complaints, without notice and an opportunity to be heard,
the essence of due process of law. The 4th Circuit upheld,
citing only 28 U.S.C. 1915.
Therefore, Cooper and his associates admitted that the
lower courts lacked authority to dismiss my Complaints
under the only authorities they cited. To make the void
judgments appear valid, Cooper, and the other miscreants,
concocted the lie that the lower courts acted under their
inherent authority (Statement #5)
III. Although the allged judgemnts in Langdon v.
Tippett and Langdon v. Swain are void, the W.D.N.C. has
illegally blocked me from seeking relief from the alleged
judgments, procured through fraud. The W.D.N.C. has
also barred me from appealing any of its decisions that bar
me from seeking relief from the fraudulently judgments.
IV. The miscreants attached a purported release
agreement to their Brief in Opposition. However, they did
not argue in said brief that my claims were barred by the
alleged release. I demonstrated in my pleadings in the
lower courts that the alleged release was procured through
fraud. It was not pled as a defense by the defendants in
the lower courts, and if they had, the defense would have
been waived when they admitted that res judicata did not
apply to Langdon v. Swain. Even if the purported release
had been valid, properly pled, and not waived, it still
wouldn't have barred my claims. The alleged release
refers to the damage from a landslide (singular) occurring
in June, 1995. Langdon v. Swain contains claims for
damages from a series of landslides that began on, or
about, July 1st, 1995, rendering my property useless by
September, 1997. I believe that the N.C. attorneys
mis-represented the number of slides, when they occurred,
and the amount of damage they caused, in order to make
it apear that the alleged release barred my claims. Their
fraud regarding those material facts is discussed in detail
in the next Section.
The fraud involved in the purported release will be
discussd in more detail in a future Section.
V. N.C. attorneys Crawford, Glover and Mallonee
made numerous false statements denying NCDOT
responsibility for the destruction and the taking of my
property in N.C. They also repeatedly misrepresented
material facts. Their tangled webs of deceit are so
convoluted that it is difficult to untangle them. In the
federal courts, Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover
fraudulently stated that the damage to my property was:
"..one event: a 'minor landslide' on or about June 1995." Appellee's Brief (04-1649), p. 3, lines 4-6 (Statement #6)
Statement #6 directly contradicts statements by
several NCDOT engineers and N.C. attorney
T.L. Mallonee, who has and/or is serving under Roy
Cooper, in the N.C. Dept. of "Justice." Statement #6
is directly contradicted by the following:
"The Complaint itself states that ..the aforementioned actions and inactions caused a series of landslides, beginning around July 1st, 1995, which rendered the property useless." T.L. Mallonee, Transcript, Langdon v. NCDOT (98-cvs-139), p. 3, March 15th, 1999 (Statement #7)
"..the landslides in question." id at p. 5, line 5 (Statement #8)
"Now he indicates that there was a series of landslides that culminated in his property being rendered useless." id at p. 5, lines 15-17 (Statement #
"...regardless of how small the very first slide may have been, significant slope failure had occurred by mid-July, 1995." T.L. Mallonee, Defendant-Appellee's Brief, p. 16, Langdon v. NCDOT (Statement #9)
"..significant slope failure, or sliding, had occurred on the Plaintiff's property." Affidavit, NCDOT engineer J.J. Swain (2-20-99) (Statement # 10)
"The earth mass on Mr. Langdon's property has shown signs of movement over the last year or so." Report of NCDOT engineer F.D. Martin (3-29-96) (Statement #11) .
An engineer that I hired also agreed that the damage to
my property was significant and occurred over along period
of time.
"The amount of property adversely affected by the slope failure was considerably greater in January 1999 than when first observed in August, 1995." Report of William Matthews, engineer (1-08-02) (Statement #12)
Clearly, the damage to my property was significant and
occured over a long period of time. The damage was not
the result of single, minor landslide occurring in June, 1995,
as fraudulently alleged by Roy Cooper, Crawford and
Glover in Statement # 6, supra.
Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover denied any NCDOT
responsibility for the taking (or the destruction) of my
property before the Fourth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme
Court.
""NCDOT and its employees consistently denied any responsibility for the landslide or landslides.." Appellee's Brief (01-1975, 4th Cir.), Langdon v. Swain, pp. 7-8 (Statement #13)
When I first approached the NCDOT about this
situation, the NCDOT engineers fraudulently denied any
NCDOT responsibilty. When I filed a Complaint for the
taking of my property against the NCDOT (Langdon v.
NCDOT) in the state courts, NCDOT attorney Mallonee
made several false statements denying NCDOT
responsibility. He flip-flopped between denying that a
taking had occurred and alleging that it was barred by a
statute of limitations.
"The Defendant-Appellee [the NCDOT] therefore submits that ..it came forward...establishing that the Plaintiff-Appellant's action accrued in July 1995." T.L. Mallonee, Defendant-Appellees' Brief, Langdon v. NCDOT, p. 16 (1-03-00) (Statement #14)
In layman's terms, Mallonee was asserting that the
taking of my property occurred in July, 1995. I agree that
there was a taking [destruction] of my property, but at a
later date. If the taking of my property did occur, as
alleged by NCDOT attorney Mallonee, why did Roy
Cooper, Crawford and Glover deny that a taking had
occurred? Why did the NCDOT and its engineers deny
in July, 1995, and afterwards that there was a taking?
A cause of action accrues when one has the right to
sue. Mallonee alleged that my right to sue for a taking of
my property accrued in July 1995. Roy Cooper, Crawford
and Glover deny that I had the right to sue, and deny that
there was a taking.
N.C. Department of Justice attorney Mallonee
succeeded in the state courts by alleging that: the damage
to my property was significant; my property was
rendered useless; the damage was the result of a series of
slides; and that my cause of action for a taking
of my property without just compensation accrued in mid-
July, 1995.
Cooper, Crawford and Glover succeeded in the federal
courts by alleging that: the damage to my property was
minor; the damage resulted from a single slide; and that
my cause of action for a taking never accrued.
Therefore, the N.C. Department of Justice has taken
exactly opposite positions, as to material facts, in
different court proceedings. They have a habit of saying
whatever is to their advantage at the time, regardless of
how false it may be.
I have given Cooper, Crawford, Glover, and Mallonee
numerous opportunities to correct their fraud, but they
have refused to do so. The courts, state and federal, have
simply ignored their fraud. Apparently, if you go into court
without an attorney, you have no rights.
VI. Roy Cooper, Crawford and Glover perpetrated
fraud on the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts
regarding the default of the Defendants in Langdon v.
Swain, Martin & Murdock, the three NCDOT engineers
who were responsible for the taking of my property,
committed fraud, blocked my right of meaningful access to
the courts, and destroyed my business. The attorneys
fraudulently stated:
"Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant had 'failed to plead or otherwise defend,' before his motions for default entry were filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). default entry was thus not appropariate and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion." Brief in Opposition (02-12), pages 10-11 (Statement #15).
There is a great deal of fraud in that statement. The
defendants failed to file a timely answer, therefore, they
were in default.
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