Judge James L.Baker Jr.Denied My Rights to Meaningful Access to the Courts, Due Process of Law and Equal Protection Under the Law---Chris Langdon  qiology@aol.com 


Judge James L. Baker Jr. Denied My Constitutional Rights - Intentional or Un-intentional?

        I attempted to obtain relief from the alleged judgment

in Langdon v. NCDOT in an Independent Action (case no.

03-CVS-173, Polk County N.C.).   A careful reading of

Page 2 of this website clearly indicates why the

purported judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT is void. The

NCDOT, through attorneys Roy Cooper, Robert Crawford

and Lisa Glover filed a motion to dismiss my Independent

Action.  The motion was granted because of fraud on the

court by the N.C. attorneys Roy Cooper, Robert Crawford

and Lisa Glover, and because of Judge James L. Baker

Jr.'s denial of my constitutional rights. 

      Judge James L. Baker Jr. granted the motion to

dismiss in a sham proceeding, in violation of my

constitutional rights. I wrote N.C. Judge James L. Baker

Jr. a letter giving him the opportunity to explain his actions

before I made my charges against him public.  The

letter states:

      " I am writing you concerning your violations of my rights to: due process of law;  equal protection under the law; and meaningful access to the courts, in case 03-CVS-173.  Those violations were intentional and/or you're incompetent.  Before I go public with my accusations, I wish to afford you with the opportunity to respond, an opportunity you never afforded me in court.  Your granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss violated the aforementioned rights for numerous reasons, including the following:  (1)  you failed to liberally construe my pro se pleadings and draw all inferences in my favor;  (2)  you denied me an opportunity to amend my Complaint, despite the liberal policy of allowing amendments to complaints in N.C.;  (3)  you failed to take my factual allegations as true;    (4)  you allowed the NCDOT attorneys to plead for some who are not party to the case;  (5)  you refused to join the necessary parties;  (6)  you refused to declare the purported judgment void for failure to join necessary parties, as required by N.C. law;  (7)  you failed to exercise the proper legal standards when considering a motion to dismiss.  The movant must prove that the Plaintiff's complaint is a claim for which relief cannot be granted.  My complaint was an Independent Action for relief from a void judgment which is a claim for which relief may be granted.  Whether or not the relief should be granted is a separate question that cannot be resolved by a motion to dismiss;  (8)  you converted the defendant's motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment by considering matters outside the pleading and by purporting to rule on the merits of the case, without giving me the required notice and time to respond;  (9) you illegally moved the hearing to settle the Record on on Appeal to another county to, for your own conveneince twice.  You had no jurisdiction to do so.  Furthermore, I had no written notice of the purported hearing , only a few days verbal notice.  I was not given the street address and the city where the purported hearing was held; and  (10)  you made the purported ruling without adequate time for consideration. You intentionally refused to apply the law because I was appearing pro se and I was suing your employer, the State of North Carolina.  If you can't put your biases aside and rule fairly, you shouldn't be a judge.  It is obvious that you do not have the qualifications required of a judge.  I hope that you don't plan to to seek re-election.  Sincerely, Christopher Langdon."

      Judge Baker received that letter on January 6th, 2006

and he hasn't denied my charges, because they are true

(I am writing this on January 25th, 2006).  My letter did not

include all of Baker's violations of my Constitutional rights.

Judge Baker is like the other judges I have encountered in

the North Carolina Courts.  He won't allow a pro se party 

(someone acting as his own attorney) to have a fair hearing. 

He simply used whatever illegal excuse he could drum up

to get rid of me.  I believe that his failure to apply the law

properly was intentional.  He has had 22 days to deny my

allegations and he hasn't done so. He hasn't even attempted

to contact me to discuss it.  In North Carolina, if you can't

afford an attorney for a civil case, you have no rights.  The

same is true in the U.S. District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina (Judge Thornburgh) and the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (See: Page 1 at the

top of the menu).

      I filed my Independent Action for relief from the

purported judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT, 98-CVS-139.

I asked for a 30 day continuance in order to amend my

Complaint.  At the time I was suffering from a severe

case of the flu.  I was severely ill for a month.  Also,

members of my family were, and are, suffering from more

serious illnesses.  Additionally, I was engaged in prosecuting

my Complaints, Langdon v. Swain and Langdon v. Tippett,

in the federal courts (See: Home Page).

        There are a large number of issues in this matter.  The

fraud by the North Carolina Department of Transporation 

(NCDOT) and its engineers, NCDOT attorneys Robert

Crawford, Lisa Glover, T.L. Mallonee, and North Carolina

Attorney General Roy Cooper, has made this matter

extremely complicated. Roy Cooper, Robert Crawford and

LisaGlover filed their motion to dismiss at the same time

they filed an answer, which is not proper, according to the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (North Carolina modeled

its rules on the federal rules and follows the federal courts'

interpretations of those rules).

      "Motion to dismiss must be filed before responsive pleading (answer) is filed."  Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Alla Medical Service, Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988).

      "Motion to dismiss for failue to state a claim was rendered moot by filing of answer."  Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, Florida, 709 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (S.D.Fla. 1989).

      My Motion for a 30 day extension of time to amend

was filed 115 days after I filed my Independent Action for

relief from the purported judgment in Langdon v. NCDOT. 

My motion for more time to amend was filed only 59 days

after the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed.

Therefore, it was timeley filed.  In Estrada v. Jacques, 321

SE 2d 240 (N.C.App. 1984), a party was allowed to amend

507 days after the Complaint was filed and after a summary

judgment motion was filed.  In Henry v. Deen, 300 SE 2d

707 (N.C. App. 1983), the court held that it was error for

the trial court to deny a motion to amend, although it was

filed 158 days after the the Complaint was filed. In Coffey v.

Coffey, 381 SE 2d 467 (N.C.App. 1989),  the court held

that it was error not to allow an amendment to a complaint

112 days after it was filed.

       Amendments are allowed under Rule 15 of N.C. Rules

of Civ. Proc. The N.C. Courts look to the federal courts and

the New York Courts for interpretation of its rules.  They

liberally allow amendments to Complaints, especially pro se

civil rights complaints like mine.

       "..the Rules of Civil Procedure achieve their purpose of insuring a speedy trial by providing for and encouraging liberal amendments to pleadings under Rule 15."  Carolina Builders v. Gelder & Associates, 289 SE 2d 628, 629 (NC App. 1982).

       "..leave to amend shall be freeely given when justice so requires is mandate to be heeded." Foman v. Davis, 83 S.CT. 227, 228 [5] (1962).

       "What might be a meritorious claim on the part of a pro se litigant unversed in the law should not be defeated without affording the pleader a reasonable opportunity to articulate his case...  trial court erred in denying pro se plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff did not state in his motion for leave how he would cure the deficiencies in his pleadings."  Gordon v. Leake, 574 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (4th Cir. 1978).

       Motions to dismiss are not usually granted.    

"Motions to dismiss pleadings are to be granted sparingly and with caution."  Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell, 204 F. 2d 8, 13 (7th Cir. 1953).

      See also:  Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 167 F.R.D.

72 (E.D.Wisc. 1996) (Defendant allowed to amend answer

21 months after the answer was filed). 

 


Cornwall v. U.S. Const. Mfg. Co., 800 F. 2d 250 (Fed. Crt.

of App. 1986) (Defendant should have been allowed to

amend on the eve of the trial);  Island Creek Coal Co. v.

Lake Shore, Inc., 832 F. 2d 274 (4th Cir.1987) (Plaintiff

should have been allowed to amend his complaint 3 & 

1/2 years after it was filed);  Eades v. Thompson, 823

F. 2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987) (inmate should have been

allowed to amend his complaint a third time).  Brandon v.

Holt, 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985) (allowed to amend

before the U.S. Supreme Court);  Satchell v. Dillworth,

745 F. 2d 781 (2nd Cir. 1984) ( pro se plaintiff should be

allowed to amend complaint, even if request is made after

dismissal);  Karim-Panari v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F. 2d

621 (9th Cir. 1988) ( pro se party should be given

statement of complaint's deficiencies before dismissal).

       The federal courts usually require that a pro se party be

given an opportunity to amend before a dismissal, even if

they haven't asked to amend.

       "The motions and recomendations apprised Grayson of his pleadings' deficiencies, but failed to inform him  'expressly' that he could amend his compalint to fix the problem...the District Court erred it should have told him that he had leave to amend his complaint to cure its deficiencies and granted him a set period of time to do so."  Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F. 3d 103, 108-109 (3rd Cir. 2002).

            Unfortunately, I was not allowed to amend my

complaint, before, or after, its dismissal, nor was I given

a list of its purported deficiencies before its dismissal.

         Judge Baker didn't give my Complaint, and the

motions in the case, a thorough consideration before

dismissing my Complaint.  He hadn't reviewed the case until

the day of the sham "hearing" and then quickly ruled against

me at the conclusion of oral argument..

Clearly, he had prejudged the matter and gave the State of

North Carolina what ever it wanted, even if it was illegal or

unfair, probably because I did not have an attorney.  

       In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court is supposed

to liberally cosntrue the Plaintiff's Complaint and take its

allegations as true.  Atlantic Research Corp. v. Metzer,

330 F. 2d 946 at 946 [1] (4th Cir. 1964); Ware v. Fort,

478 SE 2d 218, 220 (N.C.App. 1996); Flood v. New

Hanover County, 125 F. 3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1997).

Judge Baker did not take my factual allegations as true

and did not liberally construe my Complaint, as required,

before dismissing it.  Furthermore, a motion to dismiss is

not supposed to decide the merits of a case, as judge Baker

purported to do.  A claim that a purported judgemnt is void

is a claim upon which relief can be granted, as Judge Baker

must be well aware.  Whether or not the relief from the

purported judgment should be granted is a separate

question. 

          "When a federal court reviews sufficiency of complaint, before reception of any evidence.. issue is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether claimant is entitled to to offer evidence to support claims."  Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683at 1683 (1974)  

Therefore, I can only conclude that Judge Baker

intentionally dismissed my case for fraudulent reasons, or,

that he is extremely ignorant of the law.  I doubt that

he is that ignorant of the law.

      Cooper, Crawford and Glover filed a motion to dismiss

and an answer at the same time. However, a motion to

dismiss must be filed before an answer is filed. See: Aetna

Life Insurance Co. v. Alla Medical Service,

Inc., 855 F. 2d 1470, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988). 

       There were many improprieties in the sham hearing in

this case. Even worse violations of my rights came after the

sham hearing, when I appealed the court's purported

judgment (which is void).  A hearing was set to settle the

Record on Appeal. That hearing was illegally set in a

distant county, not in Polk County, where my property is

located, and where the so-called hearing was had. 

       Judge Baker had purported to illegally move the

venue for the hearing to a distant county.  I received

notice of this illegal change of venue by telephone, not

in writing, as required by N.C. law.

 The verbal notice was made on a Friday for the

following Monday, giving me less than the 5 days

notice required by N.C. law.  Certainly, I wasn't

given enough notice to drop everything and travel

from Florida to North Carolina.  Also,  I was only told

what county the sham hearing was in. I was not

told the name of the city, nor the address of the

building the hearing was in.

         "..the venue is considered 'local' because the action must be tried in the county where which is the situs of the land whose title is affected by the action.  Thompson v. Horell, 272 NC 503, 504-505, 158 SE 2d 633, 634 (1968)."  Snow v. Yates, 392 S,E, 2d 767, 768 [1,2] (1990) 

     One can only come the conclusion that Judge Baker

is grossly ignorant of the law and/or that he is grossly

lacking in ethics. Judge Baker dsispenses what is

commonly referred to as "redneck justice." 

That means that, regardless of the law, you're wrong.

He's not the first redneck judge to step all over the

rights of citizens who can't afford an attorney.

     I did write Judge Baker about this matter on

December 31st, 2005.  He didn't respond until five

weeks after receiving it, on February 10th, 2006.  He

claimed he didn't remember the case.  Considering how

long he took to respond, it's clear that he didn't want to

remember it.